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Abstract
The problem of allocating tasks to workers is of long standing fun-
damental importance. Examples of this include the classical problem of
assigning computing tasks to nodes in a distributed computing environ-
ment, as well as the more recent problem of crowdsourcing where a broad
array of tasks are slated to be completed by human workers. Extensive
research into this problem generally addresses important issues such as
uncertainty and, in crowdsourcing, incentives. However, the problem of
adversarial tampering with the task allocation process has not received as
much attention.
We are concerned with a particular adversarial setting in task alloca-
tion where an attacker may target a specific worker in order to prevent
the tasks assigned to this worker from being completed. We consider two
attack models: one in which the adversary observes only the allocation
policy (which may be randomized), and the second in which the attacker
observes the actual allocation decision. For the case when all tasks are
homogeneous, we provide polynomial-time algorithms for both settings.
When tasks are heterogeneous, however, we show the adversarial alloca-
tion problem to be NP-Hard, and present algorithms for solving it when
the defender is restricted to assign only a single worker per task. Our ex-
periments show, surprisingly, that the difference between the two attack
models is minimal: deterministic allocation can achieve nearly as much
utility as randomized.
Introduction
The problem of allocating a set of tasks among a collection of workers has
been a fundamental research question in a broad array of domains, including
distributed computing, robotics, and, recently, crowdsourcing [1, 2, 3]. Despite
the extensive interest in the problem, however, there is little prior work on
task allocation in settings where workers may be attacked, and their ability to
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successfully complete the assigned task compromised as a consequence. Such
adversarial task allocation problems can arise, for example, when tasks are of
high economic or political consequence, such as when we use crowdsourcing
to determine which executables are malicious or benign, or which news stories
constitute fake news.
We investigate the adversarial task allocation problem in which a rational
attacker targets a single worker after tasks have already been assigned. We
consider two models of information available to the attacker at the time of the
attack: partial information, where the attacker only knows the defender’s policy
(common in Stackelberg security games, for example), and full information,
where the attacker observes the actual task assignment decision. We formalize
the interaction between the attacker and requester (defender) as a Stackelberg
game in which the defender first chooses an allocation policy, and the attacker
subsequently attacks a single worker so as to maximize the defender’s losses from
the attack. We seek a strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) of this game. In the
partial information setting, we study how to compute an optimal randomized
assignment in an SSE for the requester, while in the full information model we
focus on computing an optimal deterministic assignment.
We first consider a homogeneous task setting, where all tasks have the same
utility. In this case, we show that an optimal randomized task assignment policy
can be computed in linear time. Deterministic assignment is harder, and the
algorithm we devise for that case only runs in pseudo-polynomial time (linear in
the number of tasks, and quadratic in the number of workers). While random-
ized policies in Stackelberg games are always advantageous for the defender (if
they can be used), our experiments show that the difference between optimal
deterministic and randomized policies is small, and shrinks as we increase the
number of tasks, suggesting that deterministic policy may be a good option
especially when we are uncertain about what the attacker can observe.
Next, we turn to heterogeneous tasks settings. This case, it turns out, is
considerably more challenging. Nevertheless, if we impose a restriction that only
a single worker can be assigned to a task (optimal when tasks are homogeneous,
but not in general), we can still compute an optimal randomized assignment
in linear time. Optimal deterministic assignment is much harder even with
this restriction in place, and we propose an integer programming approach for
solving it.
Related Work The problem of task allocation in adversarial settings has
been considered from several perspectives. One major stream of literature is
about robots acting in adversarial environments [4, 5]. Alighanbari and How [4]
consider assigning weapons to targets, somewhat analogous to our problem, but
do not model the decision of the adversary; their model also has rather different
semantics than ours. Robotic soccer is another common adversarial planning
problem, although the focus is typically on coordination among multiple robots
when two opposing teams are engaged in coordination and planning [5].
Another major literature stream which considers adversarial issues is crowd-
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sourcing. One class of problems is the issue of individual worker incentives in
truthfully responding to questions [6], or in the amount of effort they devote to
the task [7, 3], rather than adversarial reasoning per se. Another, more directly
adversarial, considers situations where some workers simply answer questions in
an adversarial way [8, 9]. However, the primary interest in this work is robust
estimation when tasks are assigned randomly or exogenously, rather than task
assignment itself. Similarly, prior research on machine learning when a portion
of data is adversarially poisoned [10, 11, 12, 13] focuses primarily on the robust
estimation problem, and not task allocation; in addition, it does not take ad-
vantage of structure in the data acquisition process, where workers, rather than
individual data points, are attacked.
Our work has a strong connection to the literature on Stackelberg security
games [14, 15, 16]. However, the mathematical structure of our problem is
different: for example, we have no protection resources to allocate, and instead
the defender’s decision is about allocating tasks to potentially untrusted workers.
Model
Consider an environment populated with a single requester (hereafter denoted
“defender”), a set of n workers, W , a set of m binary labeling tasks, T , and an
adversary. Each worker w ∈ W is characterized by an individual proficiency, or
the probability of successfully completing a binary labeling task, denoted pw,
and assume that pw ≥ 0.5 for all workers (otherwise, we can always flip the
received labels). In our setting, these proficiencies are known to the defender.1
Further, we assume that m is sufficiently small that any worker can complete all
tasks. For exposition purposes, we index the workers by integers i in decreasing
order of their proficiency, so that P = {p1, . . . , pn} s.t. pi ≥ pj ∀i < j, where the
set of k most proficient workers is defined as: W k. Each task t ∈ T is associated
with a utility ut that the defender obtains if this task is completed correctly.
We assume that if the task is not completed, or incorrect, the defender obtains
zero utility from it. Let ιt be the (unknown) correct label corresponding to a
task t.
The defender’s fundamental decision is the assignment of tasks to workers.
Formally, an assignment s specifies a subset of tasks T ′(s) and the set of workers,
Wt(s) assigned to each task t ∈ T
′(s). Let Lt(s) denote the labels returned by
workers in Wt(s) for t. Suppose that the defender faces a budget constraint,
of assigning m tasks; thus, each task can be assigned to a single worker, or a
subset of tasks assigned to multiple workers.2 Then the defender determines
the final label to assign to t according to some deterministic mapping δ : Lt → l
(e.g., majority label), such that L ∈ {0, 1}|Wt(s)| and l ∈ {0, 1}. We assume
that whenever a single worker w is a assigned to a task and returns a label lw,
1The issue of learning such proficiencies from experience has itself been extensively stud-
ied [17, 18, 19].
2If there are more tasks than budget, we can simply take the m tasks with the highest
utility.
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δ(lw) = lw. The defender’s expected utility when assigning a set of tasks T
′(s)
to workers and obtaining the labels is then
udef(s) =
∑
t∈T ′(s)
utE[I{δ(Lt(s)) = ιt}], (1)
where I{·} is an indicator function and the expectation is with respect to labeler
proficiencies (and resulting stochastic realizations of labels).
It is immediate that in our setting, if there is no adversary, all tasks should
be assigned to the worker with the highest pw. Our focus, however, is how to
optimally assign workers to tasks when there is an intelligent adversary who
could subsequently (to the assignment) attack one of the workers. In particular,
we assume that there is an adversary (attacker) with the goal of minimizing the
defender’s utility udef ; thus, the game is zero sum. To this end, the attacker
chooses a single worker to attack, for example, by deploying a cyber attack
against the corresponding compute node, or against the device on which the
human worker performs the tasks assigned to them. We encode the attacker’s
strategy by a vector α where αw = 1 iff a worker w is attacked (and
∑
w αw = 1
since exactly one is attacked). The attack takes place after the tasks have
already been assigned to workers.
We distinguish between two forms of adversary’s knowledge about worker-
to-task assignment before deploying the attack: 1) partial knowledge, when the
adversary only knows the defender’s policy (which may be deterministic or ran-
domized), and 2) complete knowledge, when the attacker knows the actual as-
signments of tasks to workers. The specific consequences of the attack—denial
of service, where the targeted node is taken offline and cannot communicate the
labels to the defender, or integrity attack, where incorrect labels are reported—
are immaterial in our model, since the defender receives zero utility from the
tasks assigned to the attacked worker in either case.
Clearly, when an attacker is present, the policy of allocating all tasks to the
most competent worker (or any other) will yield zero utility for the defender.
The challenge of how to split the tasks up among workers, trading off quality
with robustness to attacks, becomes decidedly non-trivial. Our goal is to address
this challenge for both models of adversarial knowledge, computing an optimal
randomized assignment (i.e., a probability distribution q over assignments s)
in the partial knowledge environment, and an optimal deterministic assignment
s in the complete knowledge setting. Formally, we aim to compute a strong
Stackelberg equilibrium of the game between the requester (leader), who chooses
a task-to-worker assignment policy, and the attacker (follower), who attacks a
single worker [20].
Homogeneous tasks
We start by considering tasks which are homogeneous, that is, ut = ut′ for any
two tasks t, t′. Without loss of generality, suppose that all ut = 1. Note that
it is immediate that we never wish to waste budget, since assigning a worker
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always results in non-negative marginal utility. Next we consider the problem of
optimal randomized assignment when the attacker only knows the (randomized)
policy, and optimal deterministic assignment (when the attacker observes the
actual assignment), showing that both can be solved efficiently.
Randomized strategy
In general, a randomized allocation involves a probability distribution over all
possible matchings with cardinality m between tasks and workers. We first
observe that this space can be narrowed to consider only matchings in which
one worker is assigned to any task.
Proposition 1. Suppose that tasks are homogeneous. There exists a Stackel-
berg equilibrium in which the defender commits to a randomized strategy with
all assignments in the support assigning at most one worker per task.
Proof. Consider an optimal randomized strategy commitment restricted to as-
sign at most one worker per task, and the associated Nash equilibrium (which
exists, by equivalence of Stackelberg and Nash in zero-sum games [21]). We
now show that this remains an equilibrium even in the unrestricted space of
assignments for the defender.
We prove by contradiction. Suppose that there is s which assigns multiple
workers for some tasks and is strictly better for the defender. Consider an
arbitrary attack α in the support of R. Given s, suppose that there is some
task t assigned to k ≥ 2 workers. Since only m assignments can be made, there
must be k− 1 tasks which are not assigned. If any of these workers is attacked,
then moving this worker to another task will not change the defender’s utility.
Thus, w.l.o.g., suppose none of the workers are attacked, and consider moving
k − 1 of these to unassigned tasks; let this be s′. Under s, the marginal utility
of the k workers completing their assigned task t is at most ut. Under s
′, the
marginal utility of these workers is
∑k
i=1 piut ≥ ut, since pi ≥ 0.5. Thus, s
′ is
weakly improving. Since this argument holds for an arbitrary α in the support
of R, the resulting s′ must also be weekly improving given R. Since s is a strict
improvement on the original Nash equilibrium strategy of the defender, then s′
must be as well, which means that this could not have been a Nash equilibrium,
leading to a contradiction. The result then follows from the known equivalence
between Nash and Stackelberg equilibria in zero-sum games.
As a consequence of this proposition, it suffices to consider assignment poli-
cies (randomized or deterministic) in which each task is assigned to a single
worker, and all m tasks are assigned. Since there are m tasks, an assignment
is then the split of these among the workers. Consider the unit simplex in Rn,
∆ = {x|
∑
w xw = 1} which represents how we split up tasks among workers.
It is then sufficient to consider the space of assignments S where x ∈ ∆ means
that each worker receives sw = mxw tasks, with the constraint that all mxw are
integers; i.e., S = {mx|x ∈ ∆,mx ∈ Z+}.
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A randomized allocation, in general, is a probability distribution q over the
set of assignments S. In principle, considering the problem of computing an
optimal randomized task allocation is daunting: even for only 14 workers and
14 tasks there are over 20 million possible assignments in S. We now observe
that in fact we can restrict attention to a far more restricted space of unit
assignments, S˜ = m{ew}w∈W ⊂ S, where ew is a unit vector which is 1 in wth
position and 0 elsewhere; i.e., assigning a single worker to all tasks. Let λ denote
a distribution over S˜.
Proposition 2. For any distribution over assignments q and attack strategy α,
there exists a distribution over S˜, λ, which results in the same utility.
Proof. Fix an attacker strategy α. For any probability distribution q over S, the
expected utility of the defender is udef (q, α) =
∑
w∈W pw(1 − αw)
∑
s∈S qssw,
where sw is the number of tasks assigned to worker w. The expected utility
of the defender for a distribution λ over S˜ is udef(λ, α) = m
∑
w∈W pw(1 −
αw)λw. Define λw =
1
m
∑
s∈S qssw. It suffices to show that
∑
w∈W λw = 1.
This follows since
∑
w∈W
∑
s∈S qssw =
∑
s∈S qs
∑
w∈W sw = m
∑
s∈S qs = m
because
∑
w∈W sw = m and q is a probability distribution.
This result allows us to restrict attention to probability distributions over
S˜.
Next, we make another important observation which implies that in an op-
timal randomized assignment the support of λ must include the best k workers
for some k. Below, we use i as the rank of a worker in a decreasing order of
proficiency.
Proposition 3. In an optimal randomized assignment λ, suppose that λi > 0
for i > 1. Then there must be an optimal assignment in which λi−1 > 0.
Proof. It is useful to write the utility of the defender as
∑
t∈T ut(
∑
i λipi−λapa),
where a is the worker being attacked. Suppose that λ is an optimal randomized
assignment, and there exist some worker i, s.t. λi > 0 and λi−1 = 0. Since
λipi > 0, there is ǫ > 0 such that (λi − ǫ)pi > ǫpi−1. First, suppose that some
node a 6= i is being attacked. Thus, λapa ≥ λjpj for all j 6= a (by optimality
of the attacker). Consequently, after ǫ was removed from the probability of
assigning to i, node a is still attacked, and the defender receives a net gain
of ǫ(pi−1 − pi) ≥ 0. Thus, if λ was optimal, so is the new assignment. Now,
suppose that a = i. Again, if a is still being attacked after ǫ is moved to i − 1,
the defender obtains a non-negative net gain as above. If instead this change
results in some other j 6= i now being attacked, the defender obtains another
net gain of (λi − ǫ)pi + ǫpi−1 − λjpj = (λipi − λjpj) + ǫ(pi−1 − pi) ≥ 0, by
optimality condition of the attacker and the fact that pi−1 ≥ pi. Again, if λ
was optimal, so is the new assignment.
The final piece of structure we observe is that in an optimal randomized
assignment the workers in the support must have the same utility for the ad-
versary. Define Wt(λ) = {w ∈ W |λw > 0}, i.e., the workers in the support of a
strategy λ.
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Proposition 4. There exists an optimal randomized assignment with λwpw =
λw′pw′ for all w,w
′ ∈Wt(λ).
Proof. Suppose that an optimal λ has two workers w,w′ ∈ Wt(λ) with λwpw >
λw′pw′ . Define umax = maxw∈Wt(λ) λwpw and umin = minw∈Wt(λ) λwpw. Let
Wmax be the set of maximizing workers (with identical marginal value to the
attacker, umax), and let z be some minimizing worker. Define K = |Wmax|. By
optimality of the attacker, some w ∈ Wmax is attacked and by our assumption
umax > umin. For any w ∈Wmax, define p¯w = 1/pw and similarly let p¯z = 1/pz.
First, suppose that p¯z <
1
K−1
∑
w∈Wmax
p¯w. Then there is some w ∈ Wmax
with p¯z < p¯w or, equivalently, pz > pw. Then there exists ǫ > 0 small enough
so that if we change λz to λz + ǫ and λw to λw − ǫ the attacker does not attack
z, and we gain ǫ(pz − pw) and either lose the same as before to the attack (if
K > 1) or lose less (if K = 1). Consequently, λ cannot have been optimal, and
this is a contradiction.
Thus, it must be that p¯z ≥
1
K−1
∑
w∈Wmax
p¯w. Suppose now that we move all
of λz from z onto all workers in Wmax, maintaining their utility to the attacker
as constant (and thus the attacker does not change which worker is attacked).
For any worker w ∈ Wmax, the resulting λ
′
w = λwpw + C, where C = ǫwpw.
Moreover, it must be that
∑
w∈Wmax
ǫw = λz. Since ǫw = C/pw, we can find
that C = λz∑
w∈Wmax
p¯w
. Consequently, the defender’s net gain from the resulting
change is
(K − 1)
λz∑
w∈Wmax
p¯w
− λzpz = λz
(
(K − 1)∑
w∈Wmax
p¯w
− pz
)
,
which is non-negative since p¯z ≥
1
K−1
∑
w∈Wmax
p¯w. We can then repeat the
process iteratively, removing any other workers z in the support but not in
Wmax to obtain a solution with uniform λ
′
wpw for all w with λ
′
w > 0 which is
at least as good as the original solution λ.
Algorithm 1 uses these insights for computing an optimal randomized assign-
ment in linear time. At the high level, it attempts to compute the randomized
assignments for all possible k most proficient workers who can be in the support
of the optimal assignment, and then returns the assignment which yields the
highest expected utility to the defender. For a given k, we can find λi directly
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}: λi =
1
pi
∑
j
1
pj
. Consequently, the utility to the defender
of an optimal randomized assignment for k tasks is k−1∑
j
1
pj
(since one worker is
attacked, and it doesn’t matter which one).
Deterministic strategy
Next we consider the setting in which the attacker observes the actual task as-
signment, in which case the defender’s focus becomes on computing an optimal
deterministic assignment. Recall that we use s = {s1, . . . , sn} to denote the
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Algorithm 1 Randomized assignment
input: The set of workers W , and their proficiencies P
return: The optimal randomized policy λ∗
1: umax ← 0
2: v ← 1
p1
3: for k ∈ {2, . . . , n} do
4: v ← v + 1
pk
5: if k−1
v
> umax then
6: umax ←
k−1
v
7: k∗ ← k
8: for i ∈ {1, . . . , k∗} do
9: λ∗i ←
1
piv
10: return λ∗
number of tasks allocated to each worker. Although the space of deterministic
allocations is large, we now observe several properties of optimal determinis-
tic assignments which allow us to devise a polynomial time algorithm for this
problem.
Our first several results are similar to the observations we made for random-
ized assignments, but require different arguments.
Proposition 5. Suppose that tasks are homogeneous. For any optimal deter-
ministic strategy s there is a weakly utility-improving deterministic assignment
s′ for the requester which assigns each task to a single worker.
Proof. Consider an optimal assignment s and the corresponding best response
by the attacker, α, in which a worker w¯ is attacked. Let a task t¯ be assigned
to a set of workers Wt¯ with |Wt¯| = k > 2. Then there must be another task t
′
which is unassigned. Now consider a worker w ∈ Wt¯. Since utility is additive,
we can consider just the marginal utility of any worker w′ to the defender and
attacker; denote this by uw′ . Let Tw′ be the set of tasks assigned to a worker
w′ under s. Let uw =
∑
t∈Tw
uMwt, where u
M
wt is the marginal utility of worker
of w towards a task t. Clearly, uw ≤ uw¯, since the attacker is playing a best
response.
Suppose that we reassign w from t¯ to t′. If w = w¯, the attacker will still
attack w (since the utility of w to the attacker can only increase), and the
defender is indifferent. If w 6= w¯, there are two cases: (a) the attacker still
attacks w¯ after the change, and (b) the attacker now switches to attack w.
Suppose the attacker still attacks w¯. The defender’s net gain is pw−u
M
wt¯
≥ 0. If,
instead, the attacker now attacks w, the defender’s net gain is uw¯−uw ≥ 0.
Consequently, the strategy space S defined above (where a single worker is
assigned for any task) still suffices.
Given a deterministic assignment s ∈ S and the attack strategy α, the
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defender’s expected utility is:
udef(s, α) =
∑
w∈W
swpw(1− αw). (2)
We now derive a similar property of optimal deterministic assignments that
held for randomized assignments: there is always an optimal deterministic as-
signment in which we assign the k most proficient workers for some k.
Proposition 6. In an optimal deterministic assignment s, suppose that si > 0
for i > 1. Then there must be an optimal assignment in which si−1 > 0.
Proof. Consider an optimal deterministic assignment s and the attacker’s best
response α in which a worker w is attacked. Now, consider moving 1 task from
i − 1 to i. Suppose that w = i, that is, the worker i is attacked. If the change
results in i − 1 being attacked, the net gain to the defender is pi(|Ti| − 1) ≥ 0.
Otherwise, the net gain is pi−1 > 0. Suppose that another worker w 6= i is
attacked. If i − 1 is now attacked, the net gain is pw(|Tw| − 1) ≥ 0 Otherwise,
the net gain is pi−1 − pi ≥ 0.
Next, we present an allocation algorithm for optimal deterministic assign-
ment (Algorithm 2) which has complexity O(n2m), quadratic in the number of
workers and linear in the number of tasks. The intuition behind the algorithm
is to consider each worker i as a potential target of an attack, and then compute
the best deterministic allocation subject to a constraint that i is attacked (i.e.,
that pisi ≥ pjsj for all other workers j 6= i). Subject to this constraint, we
consider all possible numbers of tasks that can be assigned to i, and then assign
as many tasks as possible to non-attacked workers in order of their proficiency.
Optimality follows from the fact that we exhaustively search possible targets
and allocation policies to these, and assign as many tasks as possible to the
most effective workers.
Experiments
We now experimentally consider two questions associated with our problem: 1)
what is the impact of the distribution of worker proficiencies on the requester’s
utility and the number of workers assigned, and 2) what is the difference be-
tween optimal randomized and deterministic assignment. We sample worker
proficiencies using two different distributions from which the workers’ proficien-
cies were sampled: a uniform distribution over the [0.5, 1] interval, and a power
law distribution with k = 0.5 in which proficiencies are truncated to be in this
interval. We use 100 tasks, unless stated otherwise, and vary the number of
workers between 2 and 20.3 For each experiment, we take an average of 20,000
sample runs.
In Figure 1 we compare the uniform and power law distributions in terms of
the expected defender utility and the number of workers assigned any tasks in an
3When we vary the number of workers, we generate proficiencies incrementally, adding a
single worker with a randomly generated proficiency each time.
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Algorithm 2 Optimal allocation of tasks
input: The set of workers W , and their proficiencies P
return: The optimal deterministic policy s∗
1: umax ← 0
2: for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} do
3: for si ∈ {1, . . . ,m} do
4: util← 0
5: B ← m− si
6: for j ∈ {1, . . . , n|j 6= i} do
7: sj ← min(
⌊
pi
pj
si
⌋
, B)
8: util← util+ sjpj
9: B ← B − sj
10: if B = 0 then
11: break
12: if util > umax then
13: umax ← util
14: s∗ ← s
15: return s∗
optimal randomized (Figure 1a-b) and deterministic (Figure 1c-d) assignments.
Consistently, under the power law distribution of proficiencies, the defender’s
utility is lower, and fewer workers are assigned tasks in an optimal assignment.
Next, we experimentally compare the optimal randomized and deterministic
assignments in terms of (a) defender’s utility, and (b) the number of workers
assigned tasks. In this case, we only show the results for the uniform distribution
over worker proficiencies.
It is, of course, well known that the optimal randomized assignment must be
at least as good as deterministic (which is a special case), but the key question
is by how much. As Figure 2a shows, the difference is quite small: always below
3%, and decreasing as we increase the number of tasks from 20 to 200. Simi-
larly, Figure 2b suggests that the actual policies are not so different in nature:
roughly the same number of most proficient workers are assigned to tasks in
both cases. The implication of this observation is that from the defender’s per-
spective it is not crucial to know precisely what the adversary observes about the
assignment policy: one can safely use the optimal deterministic policy, which is
near-optimal even when the attacker only observes the policy and not the actual
assignment. On the other hand, the deterministic assignment is much more ro-
bust: in a randomized assignment, if the attacker actually observes the worker
which tasks are assigned to, the defender will receive zero utility, whereas an
optimal deterministic assignment can achieve a near-optimal utility in any case.
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Figure 1: Comparison between uniform and power law distributions of worker
proficiencies.
Heterogeneous tasks
It turns out that the more general problem in which utilities are heterogeneous
is considerably more challenging than the case of homogeneous allocation. First,
we show that even if the tasks’ utilities slightly different, it may be beneficial to
assign the same task to multiple workers. Consider the case of an environment
populated with 2 workers and 2 tasks. WLOG, we order the tasks by their utility,
i.e., ut1 < ut2 . Regardless of the workers’ proficiencies, assigning one worker
per task will result in an expected utility of min(piut1 , pjut2). Still, assigning
both worker to t2 will result in an expected utility of min(piut2 , pjut2) which
is promised to be higher than the previous one. Aside from the considerably
greater complexity challenge associated in solving problems with heterogeneous
utilities alluded to in this example, there is an additional challenge of resolving
disagreement among workers, particularly when there are an even number of
them. We leave this issue for future work, and for the moment tackle a restricted
problem in which the defender nevertheless assigns only a single worker per task.
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Figure 2: Assignments’ comparison
Randomized strategy
If we assume that a single worker is assigned to each task, it turns out that we
can apply Algorithm 1 directly in the case of randomized assignment as well.
To show this, we need to extend Proposition 2 to the heterogeneous assignment
case; the remaining propositions, with the provision that one worker is assigned
per task, do not rely on the fact that tasks are homogeneous and can be extended
with minor modifications. To this end, let swt be a binary variable which is 1
iff a worker w is assigned to task t. From our assumption,
∑
w swt = 1 for each
t (since the budget constraint is m, we would assign a worker to each task).
Further, define U =
∑
t∈T ut.
Proposition 7. Suppose tasks are heterogeneous and one worker is assigned
to each task. Then for any distribution over assignments q and attack strategy
α, there exists a distribution over S˜, λ, which results in the same utility.
Proof. Fix an attacker strategy α, and let S the set of assignments s in which
a single worker is assigned to each task. For any probability distribution q
over assignments s ∈ S, the expected utility of the defender is udef(q, α) =∑
w∈W pw(1−αw)
∑
s∈S qs
∑
t∈T swtut. The expected utility of the defender for
a distribution λ over S˜ (i.e., over workers) is udef (λ, α) =
∑
t∈T ut
∑
w∈W pw(1−
αw)λw = U
∑
w∈W pw(1 − αw)λw. Define λw =
∑
s∈S
qs
∑
t∈T
swtut
U
. It suffices
to show that
∑
w∈W λw = 1. This follows since
∑
s∈S qs
∑
t∈T
∑
w∈W swtut
U
=
U
∑
s∈S qs
U
= 1 because
∑
w∈W swt = 1 and q is a probability distribution.
Thus, if we constrain the defender to use a single worker per task, we can
randomize over workers, rather than full assignments, allowing us to compute a
(restricted) optimal randomized assignment in linear time.
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Deterministic strategy
We now show that the defender’s deterministic allocation problem, denoted
Heterogeneous tasks deterministic assignment (HTDA), is NP-hard even if we
restrict the strategies to assign only a single worker per task.
Proposition 8. HTDA is strongly NP-hard even when we assign only one
worker per task.
Proof. We reduce from the Bin packing problem (BP), which is a strongly NP-
Hard problem. In the bin packing problem, objects of different volumes must be
packed into a finite number of bins or containers each of volume V in a way that
minimizes the number of bins used. We define the set of items I = {i1, . . . , im}
with sizes ς = {ς1, . . . , ςn}, the volume as V = γ, and the set of containers as
C = {c1, . . . , cn}. The decision problem is deciding if objects will fit into a
specified number of bins. Our transformation maps the items to m + 1 tasks
with the following utilities {ς1, . . . , ςn, γ}, the n containers to n+1 workers while
considering the private case where all the workers have the same proficiency (i.e.,
pi = pj , ∀wi, wj ∈ W ). If we started with a YES instance for the BP problem,
there is an assignment of items to containers under the volume γ. Let A be
that assignment. Then if A(ti) = j, we assign task ti to worker j on HTDA.
Also, we assign task tm+1 (with utility γ) to worker n + 1. The utility of this
task assignment is: V + γ − γ = V . For the case that with a NO instance for
the BP problem, assume in negation that this is a YES instance for the HTDA
problem. I.e., there exists an assignment in HTDA such that V ∗ − γ∗ ≥ V ,
where V ∗ =
∑
wi∈W
∑
t∈T xitutpi and γ
∗ = max(
∑
t∈T xitutpi). This implies
that V +γ ≥ V ∗. Substituting V ∗ = V +γ∗, we get that V +γ−γ∗ ≥ V , hence,
γ ≥ γ∗ ≥
∑
t∈T xitutpi, ∀wi ∈ W . Note that this contradicts the assumption
that this is a YES instance for the HTDA problem. The reduction can clearly
be performed in polynomial time.
We propose the following integer program for computing the optimal deter-
ministic strategy for the defender (assuming only one worker is assigned per
task):
max
s,γ
∑
w∈W
∑
t∈T
swtutpw − γ (3a)
s.t. :
∑
w∈W
∑
t∈T
swt = m (3b)
γ ≥
∑
t∈T
swtutpw, ∀w ∈ W (3c)
∑
w
swt = 1, ∀t ∈ T (3d)
swt ∈ {0, 1}. (3e)
The objective (3a) aims to maximize the defender’s expected utility given the
adversary’s attack (second term). Constraint (3b) ensures that each allocation
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Figure 3: Percentage difference between optimal randomized and deterministic
allocations, when we constrain to assign one worker per task and tasks are
heterogeneous.
assigns all the possible tasks among the different workers and Constraint (3c)
validates that the adversary’s target is the worker who contributes the most to
the defender’s expected utility. Finally, Constraint (3d) ensures that only one
worker is assigned for each task.
Experiments
This analysis compares the defender’s expected utility while using optimal ran-
domized and deterministic strategies when we restrict that only one worker can
be assigned to each task. We used CPLEX version 12.51 to solve the linear and
integer programs above. The simulations were run on a 3.4GHz hyperthreaded
8-core Windows machine with 16 GB RAM. We generated utilities of different
tasks using 6 different uniform distributions: {[0,0.5],[0,1],[0,5],[0,10],[0,50],[0,100]},
varied the number of workers between 2 and 15, and considered 15 tasks. Worker
proficiencies were again sampled from the uniform distribution over the [0.5,1]
interval. Results were averages of 1,000 simulation runs.
Figure 3 shows proportion difference between randomized and deterministic
allocations for different numbers of workers and distributions from which task
utilities are generated. As we can observe, the difference is remarkably small:
in all cases, the gain from using a randomized allocation is below 0.6%, which is
even smaller (by a large margin) than what we had observed in the context of
homogeneous tasks. However, there is an interesting difference we can observe
from the homogeneous task setting: now increasing the number of workers con-
siderably increases the advantage of the randomized allocation, whereas when
tasks are homogeneous we saw the opposite trend.
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Discussion and Conclusions
We consider the problem of assigning tasks to workers in an adversarial setting
when a worker can be attacked, and their ability to successfully complete as-
signed tasks compromised. In our model, since the defender obtains utility only
from correctly annotated tasks, the nature of the attack is less important; thus,
the attacker can compromise the integrity of the labels reported by the worker,
or simply prevent the worker from completing the tasks assigned to them. A
key feature of our model is that the attack takes place after the tasks have been
assigned to workers, but has considerable structure in that exactly one worker
is attacked. Additional structure is imposed by considering two settings: one
in which the attacker only observes the defender’s (possibly randomized) task
allocation policy, and the other in which the actual task assignment decision is
known. We show that the optimal randomized allocation problem in the for-
mer setting (in the sense of Stackelberg equilibrium commitment) can be found
in linear time. However, our algorithm for optimal deterministic commitment
is pseudo-polynomial. Furthermore, when tasks are heterogeneous, we show
that the problem is more challenging, as it could be optimal to assign multiple
workers to the same task. If we nevertheless constrain that only one worker
is assigned per task, we can still compute an optimal randomized commitment
in linear time, while deterministic commitment becomes strongly NP-Hard (we
exhibit an integer linear program for the latter problem).
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